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From ASPAC to EAS: 
South Korea and the Asian Pacific Region 
 
Brian Bridges1 
 
Abstract 
 
South Korea’s diplomatic and security focus has inevitably been on 
North-east Asia and its difficult relationship with its northern 
neighbour, but South Korea also has a role to play in the broader 
Asian Pacific region. This paper analyses South Korea’s increasing 
economic, political and cultural links with the region and its role in 
the development of Asian Pacific regionalism. Utilising the concept 
of ‘middle power’, it argues that, while clearly South Korea cannot 
ignore what is happening in its immediate geographical environment, 
it does have the economic and political resources to enable it to take 
advantage of the opportunities for greater interactions with other 
parts of the Asian Pacific region, if the political will exists. 
 
 
South Korea’s relations with its northern neighbour and with the key 
major powers interested in the Korean peninsula do represent an 
important part of that country’s external relations, as the ‘missile 
crisis’ from mid-June 2006 testifies. Yet they do not represent the 
complete picture of South Korea’s external relations. This paper 
endeavours to examine the development of South Korea’s role 
within the broader Asian Pacific region. The starting point for this 
paper comes from the autobiography of one South Korean foreign 
minister, Lee Tong-won, who was responsible for, arguably, the 
earliest Korean initiative towards the region, the Asia Pacific 
Council (or ASPAC, as it generally became known). As he claimed, 
‘for the first time in history, an international institution was founded 
with Korea at the helm’; it was an organisation of 10 Asian and 
                                                 
1  Brian Bridges is a Professor in the Department of Politics and Sociology and 
Associate Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University. This 
is a revised version of a paper presented at the International Conference on Korea’s 
Future: Visions and Challenges, hosted by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, 
Lingnan University, 11 May 2006. Participants’ helpful comments are duly 
acknowledged. 
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Australasian states trying to create a ‘peaceful revolution’ of Asians 
gathering together in cooperation.2 Founded in 1966, ASPAC was all 
but defunct by 1972, and it was to be several decades before South 
Korea was again to be as active in pushing regional cooperation. 
This does not mean that South Korea had nothing to do with the 
Asian Pacific region, for the economic links became increasingly 
stronger, but, at least until the late 1980s, any moves towards 
promoting Asian ‘regionalism’, however tentative, came from other 
parts of the Asian Pacific region. 
 
The intense and enduring competition for political and diplomatic 
legitimacy carried on between the North and the South during the 
post-Korean War period found expression in the rivalry to enhance 
their respective international status, not least through achieving 
diplomatic recognition and membership of regional and international 
organisations. Until the early 1970s, the South put ‘little effort’ into 
developing its linkages with Third World countries, 3  but, after 
abandoning its version of the West German ‘Hallstein doctrine’, the 
South undoubtedly worked hard at diversifying its links away from 
solely the United States and Japan, important though those two 
partners remained. In this endeavour, the growing economic power 
of South Korea, and the dilution of some of its anti-communist 
rhetoric outside the immediate confines of policy towards the North, 
undoubtedly helped. Indeed, in the 1980s ‘economic diplomacy and 
diplomatic pragmatism’ became the ‘defining characteristics’ of 
South Korea’s foreign policy and this trend was carried over into the 
1990s as increasingly South Korea seemed to be winning the 
diplomatic struggle with the North.4  
 
In the 1990s, this pragmatic foreign policy approach began to find 
expression in two new, but not totally compatible, ways. Firstly, in 
                                                 
2 Lee Tong Won and Hyun-key Kim Hogarth, Task and Times: Memoirs of Lee Tong 
Won, Foreign Minister who Finalized the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty, Seoul: 
Jimoondang, 2004, p. 272.  
3  James Hoare and Susan Pares, Korea: An Introduction (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1988), p. 189. The Hallstein doctrine meant that West Germany would 
not recognise any state that recognised East Germany.  
4  B.K. Gills, Korea versus Korea: A case of contested legitimacy (London : 
Routledge, 1996), p 204. For details of the relative diplomatic successes of the South 
see chapters 7 and 8 of Gills’ book.  
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an aspiration to be recognised as an equal of the Western advanced 
countries, including Japan, which was to find symbolic recognition 
through South Korea’s admission to the OECD in 1996. Secondly, to 
try to play a ‘bridging role’ between developed and developing 
countries, both in international organisations such as the long-
running Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) negotiations and in setting up its own economic 
cooperation fund for developing countries. However, the 1990s were 
to show that the nearer South Korea came to joining the ‘top club’ of 
the world’s economies, the more difficult it was to fulfil the second 
role and during the Kim Young-sam administration the rhetoric of 
the ‘mediating’ or ‘bridging’ role all but disappeared. Kim instead 
emphasised the first dimension, advocating that South Korea should 
become ’a first-rate nation in the coming century’ by utilising 
globalization (or segyehwa, the catch-word of the Kim 
administration).5 However, Kim’s ambitious plans were to founder 
in the 1997 financial crisis, which was to force a rethinking of 
priorities on his successor, Kim Dae-jung.   
 
It is against this background that this paper will discuss South 
Korea’s involvement as a so-called ‘middle power’ in 
‘regionalization’ and regionalism’ in the Asian Pacific over the past 
decade or so. Definitions of these three terms remain contested. 
There is no commonly accepted definition of a ‘middle power’.6 
Components of both ‘hard power’ such as military power (defence 
self-sufficiency) or ‘soft power’ (creative diplomatic potential) must 
be considered. After his own review of the literature, Korean scholar 
Joo Jae Woo has suggested, in the South Korean context, a number 
of characteristics that might be considered: economic achievement, 
recognition as a democratic state, respected foreign policy with 
strong regional orientation, international leadership. 7  However, a 
state can be considered a middle power without being a democracy. 
                                                 
5  Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995; Samuel S. Kim, ‘Korea and 
Globalisation (Segyehwa): A Framework for Analysis’ in Samuel S. Kim (ed), 
Korea’s Globalisation (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp, 1-28. 
6 See the discussion by Nikki Baker in Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook, eds, 
Asia-Pacific in the New World Order (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.190-193. 
7 Joo Jae Woo, Korea’s Role in East Asia: Constructing an East Asian Regionalism 
(Singapore: East Asian Institute, 2006), pp. 6-7.  
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More important is whether a state can assert itself in its immediate 
environment in such a way that it is considered an important player 
by neighbouring countries. In that context, a significant but not 
overwhelming degree of military power as well as economic and 
diplomatic power can be considered relevant. It should be noted the 
term ‘middle power’ is preferred to that of a ‘semi-periphery’ state, a 
concept much analysed by dependency and world systems theorists 
such as Immanuel Wallerstein, because the latter term has almost 
exclusively an economic meaning within the global capitalist 
system, whereas the discussion here is about South Korean power 
not just in its economic dimension, but also in its diplomatic, 
military and even cultural dimensions. 
 
The distinctions between regionalization and regionalism are often 
vague,8 but, for the purposes of this paper, a broad conceptualisation 
is adopted, with regionalization referring to the process of 
interaction within a region and regionalism to the tendency to create 
institutions or at least mechanisms to assist in that interaction. While 
appreciating that it is difficult to separate the two concepts, this 
paper will first briefly discuss South Korea’s involvement in 
regionalization and then focus on its role in the emerging Asian 
regionalism.  
 
South Korea’s Links with the Region 
 
South Korea’s economic linkages with the Asian Pacific region, 
particularly the resource-rich countries of South-east Asia, had 
grown considerably as Korean industrialisation continued apace 
from the 1960s. South Korea’s lack of natural resources meant a 
reliance on overseas sources of raw materials. While most of the 
energy sources came from the Middle East (at least until some 
diversification, including sourcing from Indonesia and Brunei, since 
the 1980s), the Asian Pacific region did supply other vital raw 
materials and also intermediate products. By 1997 around 10% of 
                                                 
8 See, for example, the discussions in Joseph Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-
Pacific Order: the Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region, Volume II 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2003) and Liu Fu-kuo, “East Asian regionalism: 
Theoretical perspectives” in Fu-kuo Liu and Philip Regnier (eds), Regionalism in East 
Asia: Paradigm Shifting? (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. xiii-xxxi. 
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Korean imports came from the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) countries; by adding in Japan, China and Taiwan 
around 40% of all imports came from the Asian Pacific, compared to 
around 35% in 1980.9 Similarly the importance of the Asian Pacific 
region as an export market for South Korean manufactures had also 
grown, if anything more significantly. In 1980, Japan, China, 
Taiwan and ASEAN collectively accounted for around 29% of total 
South Korean exports, but by 1997 this had risen to 47%. After 
fluctuations caused by the Asian financial crisis, the above Asian 
states accounted for almost exactly 50% of all South Korean exports 
and 48% of imports in 2004; clearly China was a significant factor in 
this situation, having overtaken first Japan and then the United 
States to become by that year South Korea’s largest trading partner.  
 
Korean companies also increased their investment in the region from 
the mid-1980s, as outward foreign direct investment (FDI) began to 
be actively state-supported. By 1997 44% of Korea’s cumulative 
outward FDI went to Asia, compared to only 31% in the 1968-80 
period. Outward Korean FDI went through fluctuations after the 
Asian financial crisis, as companies reassessed their priorities. In 
particular, China became increasingly attractive to Korean firms, and 
the flows increased so rapidly that, taking cumulative totals of FDI 
from 1968-November 2005 (on an arrival basis), South Korean FDI 
into China exceeded that of the combined flows to the other 9 Asian 
destinations and was almost equal to South Korean FDI into the 
United States, long the leading destination for such FDI.10  
 
South Korea had long had a restrictive attitude towards inward FDI, 
but since its OECD accession and most significantly after the Asian 
financial crisis active inward investment promotion has become a 
feature of policy-making.11 Most inward FDI has come from the 
United States and Europe, but from the Asian Pacific region Japan 
has remained an important source of FDI with around 15% of all 
                                                 
9 Statistics in this paragraph derived from Christopher Dent, The Foreign Economic 
Policies of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), 
pp. 148-151.  
10 My own calculations from data on http://www.mocie.go.kr. 
11 Dent, op.cit., pp. 149, 161-163. FDI figures quoted in this paragraph are drawn 
from http://www.mocie.go.kr data.  
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inward FDI in cumulative terms, with Singapore, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong and more recently China also investing (Chinese FDI into 
South Korea rose dramatically in 2004 from very low levels to over 
US$1 billion). 
 
South Korea has, of course, another significant linkage with the 
Asian Pacific region, culturally, through what is now well-known as 
the “Korean wave’ (hallyu).  Originating with popular music, 
passing through TV soap operas and films, it has become a 
phenomenon embracing Korean culture in a much broader sense, 
including Korean food, customs and even traditional clothing.12 The 
Korean wave has proved to be not just an economic boost (in 2005 
Korean cultural products exports were worth around US$1 billion, 
most of them to the Asian Pacific region), but also, as Foreign 
Minister Ban Ki-moon has argued, a means to bring South Korea 
long-overdue respect. 13  In the process, according to one cultural 
policy official, South Korea has ‘changed from a receiver to a 
transmitter of culture’.14 
 
APEC and Regional Aspirations 
 
Although, as noted above, South Korea’s economic linkages with 
the Asian Pacific region had been growing and it had been the 
principal sponsor of ASPAC in the late 1960s, South Korea had 
played a rather low-key role in the subsequent development of 
regional cooperation concepts and organisations. A proposal by 
President Chun Doo Hwan, in 1982, for a summit of regional leaders 
received nothing more than polite but non-committal responses, so 
South Korea had to content itself with participation in business-
related regional organisations, such as the Pacific Basin Economic 
Council. This relatively passive approach was to change when 
Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke used his visit to Seoul in 
                                                 
12 Kang Chul-keun, ‘The Korean Wave and New Frontier’, Korea Policy Review, 
January 2006, pp. 23-26. See also Lisa Leung’s work, such as ‘Virtualizing the 
“Korean Wave”; the politics of (transnantional) cyberfandom in Daejangguem’, Asian 
Communication Research, September 2005, pp. 65-90.   
13 Time, 14 November 2005.  
14  You Hong-june, ‘The Origin and Future of Hallyu’, Korea Focus, Summer 2006, p. 
123. 
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early 1989 to launch his proposal for an Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum. While drawing on earlier regional 
initiatives and organisations, APEC marked a qualitative shift in the 
level of official involvement, as it was intended to be the first ever 
region-wide inter-governmental organisation. 
 
South Korea proved enthusiastic, assisting the Australians in 
lobbying for its realisation and becoming one of the 11 countries to 
attend the founding ministerial meeting of APEC later that same 
year. Apart from fitting in with the perceived need to gradually 
diversify external links while keeping the US connection, APEC 
had, according to Chung Lee and Charles Morrison, three other 
benefits for South Korea. 15  Firstly, it helped to accord political 
legitimacy to South Korea. Secondly, it allowed South Korea to 
develop ties with China, for South Korean officials adroitly 
negotiated with the Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kong 
governments to ensure that all three were able to join APEC at the 
Seoul ministerial meeting in 1991 (South Korea and China finally 
recognised each other in 1992). Thirdly, South Korea believed that it 
could gain bargaining leverage in its negotiations with its larger 
trading partners through association with other medium-sized or 
smaller nations.  
 
In the early years of APEC’s existence, South Korea found little 
difficulty in following the general trend, which was for setting up 
general principles and more talk than action. However, in 1993 
APEC entered a second phase in its development; under the impetus 
of the United States, which was the lead country that year, the level 
of governmental representation was raised with the first ever summit 
meeting of leaders (a practice that has now become the norm) and 
more concerted efforts were made to transform the organisation into 
a more powerful force for trade and investment liberalisation. 16 
                                                 
15 Chung H. Lee and Charles Morrison, ‘APEC and two Koreas’, Pacific Focus, 
Spring 1996, pp. 32-33. 
16  On the US ambitions and the intra-APEC debates of 1993-96, see Donald 
Hellmann, ‘America, APEC, and the Road Not Taken: International Leadership in the 
Post-Cold War Interregnum in the Asia-Pacific’, in Donald Hellmann and Kenneth 
Pyle (eds), From APEC to Xanadu : Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold 
War Pacific, (New York : M.E.Sharpe, 1997), pp. 70-97. 
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South Korea moved from an attitude of enthusiasm to a more mixed 
one. The Koreans had little difficulty either with the summit idea as 
it gave yet another opportunity for Kim Young-sam to meet foreign 
leaders or with APEC being utilised as a ‘weapon’ with which to 
beat the Europeans into coming to a deal on the long-winded GATT 
talks, but they were less sure of the implications of the full-blooded 
liberalisation targets which were implied by the declarations which 
came out of the 1994, 1995 and 1996 APEC meetings.  
 
Although the APEC vision of trade liberalisation fitted in with the 
gradual trend in that direction which the South Korean economy was 
taking anyway, South Korea also had special reservations about its 
highly-protected rice market, the peculiar nature of its specific bans 
on a large number of Japanese products, its general resistance to 
foreign investment and its fears that its own market might be flooded 
by lower-cost manufactures from China and South-east Asia. 17 
However, as was to become clear in the subsequent years, South 
Korea was not alone in being cautious about embracing the US-style 
liberalisation agenda for APEC; indeed it was far from being the 
most worried member country. The APEC liberalisation target plans 
were split into two categories, with the year 2010 as the completion 
date for advanced countries and 2020 for developing countries. 
Since South Korea was on the verge of achieving OECD 
membership, its claims that it should have the later deadline were 
not convincing and it was placed into the ‘advanced’ category.  
 
However, the Asian financial crisis and South Korea’s own 
particular troubles were to make the Koreans more disillusioned with 
APEC, in what can be described as the third phase of APEC’s 
development, a stage in which the organisation seemed to be losing 
its way. Kim Young-sam had already committed himself to attend 
the Vancouver APEC meeting in November 1997 when the crisis hit 
South Korea. Even within his administration, opinions differed about 
whether he should attend in those circumstances, but he decided to 
go anyway and use the opportunity to appeal to the member 
countries for assistance. His appeals, however, largely fell on deaf 
ears. The other APEC leaders listened sympathetically, but did little 
                                                 
17 Lee and Morrison, op.cit.,pp. 37-38. 
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else other than offer words of ‘moral support’. Kim returned home 
disappointed, faced with no alternative but to do a deal with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Of course, South Korea’s case 
was not the only one for APEC to face in 1997; it proved singularly 
inept at offering collectively anything much to help other suffering 
members either.18 
 
When Kim Dae-jung subsequently attended the next few APEC 
summits, he used these opportunities to stress that the South Korean 
economy had switched to becoming genuinely open, for he saw 
foreign investment as a crucial part of his recovery plans. But having 
whole-heartedly joined the group of countries strongly favouring 
liberalisation, he found that this group was if anything in an even 
smaller minority within APEC as many members clearly saw the 
Asian financial crisis as evidence of the dangers of excessive 
openness. For Kim, the APEC meetings therefore served more as a 
means to hold bilateral meetings with leaders of key partners than as 
a forum that would bring substantial and speedy benefit to the 
Korean economy. Some Korean scholars argued that South Korea’s 
level of economic development and its overall economic size put it 
in the ’middle’ of APEC, with the consequent potential to ‘mediate’ 
the North-South economic relationship within APEC.19  However, 
the financial crisis, by undermining the country’s credibility, wiped 
out any immediate possibility of South Korea playing that kind of 
role within APEC.  
 
The 9-11 events in the United States inevitably impacted on APEC, 
which has subsequently entered what might be considered its fourth 
phase, one in which the slow process on economic cooperation has 
been overshadowed by more political and security-related issues, 
such as the war on terrorism, coming onto the agenda of annual 
meetings. Some countries, led by the United States, have 
consequently wished to utilise the APEC meetings to discuss 
policies with a more political dimension, while others have resisted, 
                                                 
18 Mark Beeson, ‘Reshaping Regional Institutions: APEC and the IMF in East Asia’, 
Pacific Review, Vol.12, No.1 (1999), pp 1-24.  
19 Yong Chool Ha and Taebyon Kim, ‘Reflections on APEC: A Korean View’, in 
Hellmann and Pyle, op.cit.,p.169. 
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arguing that APEC should continue to focus on its original economic 
role. Under the new Roh Moo-Hyun administration, South Korea did 
not take a strong position in this debate. The high-point of South 
Korean involvement, the hosting of the 2005 APEC Summit in 
Busan, therefore reflected a Korean attempt to balance between the 
two viewpoints. As a result, under Korean direction, the APEC 
meetings in Busan concentrated on three themes: reviving the stalled 
WTO trade negotiations, combating terrorism and preparing against 
an avian influenza pandemic.  
 
ARF and ASEAN+3 
 
In the 1990s, South Korea became involved in two other regional 
groupings apart from APEC, which also not only marked recognition 
of the country’s international status but also provided avenues for 
diversification: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the informal 
ASEAN + 3 leaders’ meetings. The end of the Cold War had 
provoked a debate in the Asia Pacific region about the future 
‘security architecture’ of the region. Echoing in a lesser key the 
much more intense European debate, Asian Pacific regional policy-
makers and an active ‘second-track’ academic network discussed 
alternatives. Rejecting models too closely drawn from the European 
experience, the initially reluctant ASEAN decided to build on its 
existing external dialogue arrangements to create the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, which met for the first time in 1994.20 It started 
with 17 members, including South Korea, but has now expanded to 
25 members, including North Korea. Its annual meetings, and its 
expanding number of working-level sessions in between, have 
tended to move at a pace which is comfortable for the most cautious 
members - China and some of the ASEAN members - but its 
significance lay in it being the first ever such organisation to bring 
so many regional states around the same table to discuss security 
issues.  
 
Although the focus has tended to be more on South-east Asian-
related issues, South Korea has been able to raise Korean issues 
                                                 
20 On the creation and development of ARF see Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional 
Forum, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996). 
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from time to time. Nonetheless, it is true that even at the July 1994 
meeting, when the ‘nuclear crisis’ on the Korean peninsula was at a 
crucial stage, ARF did not take a concerted position that would be of 
real value to South Korea. Successive chairman’s concluding 
statements made at the annual ARF meetings tended to be limited to 
rather anodyne expressions about the ’importance of peace and 
security on the Korean peninsula’, the need for dialogue, support for 
the activities of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organisation (KEDO) and, since the eruption of the second ‘nuclear 
crisis’, calls for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.21 At the time of 
ARF’s formation, North Korea did approach ASEAN to enquire 
about membership, but it was told that until it had shown better 
behaviour over nuclear site inspections, it would not be considered.22 
Subsequently, some ARF members felt that ‘its participation should 
be a reward for conducting better relations with South Korea’.23 
Under Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’, however, the South was 
more positive to the idea of North Korea joining ARF and with other 
states in the region noting the North’s diplomatic offensive in early 
2000 and the planned North-South summit, it was decided to allow 
the North to join with effect from the July 2000 ARF meeting in 
Bangkok, which it duly did. However, with ASEAN continuing to 
insist on its diplomatic centrality within ARF, the organisation has 
continued to devote relatively little time to considering North-east 
Asian security issues. However, the annual ARF meetings have at 
least provided opportunities for private bilateral meetings in the 
margins between the North Korean Foreign Minister and, at different 
times, his counterparts from the South, Japan and the United 
States.24 
 
Of more utility to the South Korean government in terms of the 
prestige attached, however, has been its participation in a new 
                                                 
21 See, for example, the 1996, 1997, 2004 and 2005 ARF chairman’s statements at 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org. Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the 
Balance of Power in ASEAN and ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p.35, has 
argued that ARF is ‘in no position to tackle’ the Korean issue.  
22 Interview with a South-east Asian diplomat, July 1994. 
23 Leifer, op.cit. p. 48. 
24 Emmers, op.cit, p. 35; ASEAN Regional Forum website report on 2005 Vientiane 
meeting. 
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informal format, called the ASEAN+3 summits, which have been 
held annually since late 1997. This new format is an evolution out of 
the concept for an ‘East Asian Economic Group’, soon modified to 
the name ‘East Asian Economic Caucus’ (EAEC), put forward by 
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad in 1990. 
Designed as a counter-balance to the Australian-proposed APEC, 
EAEC would exclude both the North American and the Australasian 
states. South Korea was one of the intended participants, but, well 
aware that the Americans were strongly against the concept (the US 
Secretary of State James Baker actually used the 1991 APEC 
meeting in Seoul as venue for strongly lobbying against it), the 
South Koreans were non-committal.25 With other ASEAN members 
lukewarm, the concept remained quiescent, until fortuitously the 
creation of a new inter-regional dialogue grouping with Europe in 
1996 - the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) - resulted in an Asian 
participation that strongly resembled those countries originally 
envisaged as EAEC participants. Emboldened by this precedent, and 
drawing on Asian defensiveness against the West as the Asian 
financial crisis took its toll, Mahathir succeeded in persuading his 
ASEAN colleagues that the planned 1997 Summit of ASEAN 
leaders, designed to consolidate the organisation in the face of new 
membership and economic challenges, should hold a separate 
meeting to which the Japanese, Chinese and South Korean leaders 
should be invited. The Japanese prime minister had been invited to a 
previous ASEAN summit, in 1987, but it was the first occasion for 
China and South Korea to be so invited.  
 
With Kim Young-sam caught up in the IMF negotiations and the 
presidential elections, Prime Minister Koh Kun represented South 
Korea in the December 1997 summit. President Kim Dae-jung 
attended subsequent annual meetings and President Roh Moo-hyun 
has continued this practice. The December 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit 
in Manila was memorable for some lofty rhetoric from the 
Philippines’ President Joseph Estrada about moving to ‘an East 
Asian common market…..one East Asian community’ and on a 
more practical level an agreement to strengthen trade and investment 
                                                 
25 Lee and Morrison, op.cit., pp. 34-35. 
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and information technology cooperation.26 However, also important 
for Kim in 1999 was the first ever three-way summit talks with the 
Japanese prime minister and Chinese premier, after the initially 
cautious Chinese agreed to join in. Sensitive security issues were 
avoided, but economic and environmental issues were covered 
during the breakfast talks. 27  These informal three-way summit 
meetings have continued to be held by their successors every year, 
except for 2005, when the tense state of Sino-Japanese relations led 
to the Chinese cancelling the meeting.  
 
It is tempting to argue that despite its financial crisis, South Korea 
was still considered important enough to be invited as an equal 
participant with China and Japan. A more cynical approach would be 
to say that, since the peculiar political status of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong excluded them, there were no real alternatives if the ASEAN 
hosts wanted to include any other countries to balance the two giants 
of Japan and China. A more charitable analysis might be to argue 
that, paradoxically, it was because of South Korea’s - and Asia’s 
financial collapse – that this opportunity presented itself. One of the 
net effects of the Asian financial crisis was to increase interest in 
East Asian, as opposed to Pacific-wide, regionalism. South Korean 
participation in this as yet informal arrangement of ASEAN+3, 
coming at a time indeed when the country was at one of its lowest 
ebbs in economic terms, did prove a welcome boost to Kim Dae-
jung’s diplomacy. In this sense, then, South Korea’s regional status 
was not diminished markedly by the Asian financial crisis.  
 
There was one further related regional initiative that posed special 
questions for South Korea, namely, the idea of creating an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) or similar form of regional ‘self-help’ 
financial organisation which was not dominated by the Western 
powers. Japan had originally floated the idea of setting up a $100 
billion Asian fund in September 1997, but it had been dropped after 
strong opposition from the United States, which clearly was worried 
about undermining the IMF. The Kim Young-sam government had 
initially supported the Japanese proposal, but after it had to turn to 
                                                 
26 South China Morning Post, 29 November 1999. 
27 Ibid. 
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the IMF for assistance its attitude cooled. The Kim Dae-jung 
administration, wedded to the IMF package, had not pursued the 
idea further. Indeed, while the new government did join in the calls 
for a new international financial architecture, it also made it clear 
that one of the objectives should be for ‘the IMF and the World 
Bank’s role in both managing and preventing crises should be 
strengthened’ and argued that any regional cooperative scheme 
would ‘require a more long-term approach’.28 This rather ambivalent 
attitude continued to be a feature of the Korean approach to the 
subsequent intermittent and rather fruitless discussions on regional 
cooperative financing arrangements.29 Nevertheless, South Korea did 
subsequently agree to participate in the so-called Chiang Mai 
Initiative, a currency swap mechanism created in May 2000.  
 
However, as gradually the ASEAN+3 process became more 
institutionalised as a consultation mechanism, South Korea became 
more active, in two respects. Firstly, it has come to be seen by the 
AEAN states as, on occasions, playing a useful balancing role 
between the two economic giants of China and Japan. For example, 
it was former South Korean foreign minister, Han Sung-joo, who 
was asked to chair the Asian Vision Group, which was established at 
Kim Dae-jung’s initiative and which finally in 2001 set out ideas 
about the prospects of the ASEAN+3 process, including the 
possibility of eventually forming some kind of East Asian 
community. 30  Secondly, it helped to coordinate research and 
collaborative policy ideas amongst the three Northeast Asian 
members, such as in environmental, trade and financial 
cooperation.31 These discussions may, in turn, have helped to feed 
into President Roh’s concept of positioning South Korea as a 
regional business hub for North-east Asia.  
 
                                                 
28  MOFE policy statement on ‘The New International Financial Architecture’, 
http://www.mofe.go.kr/english/data/E_News/b042202.htm. 
29 There were differences of opinion within the ruling coalition, as prime minister 
Kim Jong-pil showed strong support for a Japanese-led funding initiative, whereas 
Kim Dae-jung seems to have been more cautious. Korea Herald, 1 December 1998. 
30  Bradley Babson, ‘Korea’s Regional Economic Role’, East Asia, Winter 2003, 
Vol.20., No.4, p. 102; Hyun Seog Yu, ‘The Role of Korea in East Asian Regional 
Economic Cooperation’, East Asia, Winter 2003, Vol. 20, No.4, p.84. 
31 Babson, op.cit., p. 102; Yu, op.cit. p. 85. 
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Nationalism, Regionalism, Globalization and a ‘Middle Power’ 
 
South Korean presidents do like to leave their mark on the country, 
not least by developing particular visions – or political hallmarks – 
for their administrations. As mentioned earlier, the desire to improve 
South Korea’s international status during the Kim Young-sam 
administration was to become increasingly intertwined with his 
concept of segyehwa (globalization). Kim’s attendance at the APEC 
Summit in Indonesia in November 1994 convinced him that South 
Korea really needed to add some substance to its role if it was be a 
fully-rated player in the Asian Pacific and beyond. 32   The term 
segyehwa, however, seemed to mean different things to different 
people. For some, it meant liberalisation and de-regulation of the 
economy. For others, it implied a more thorough-going renovation 
of the whole socio-economic system of Korea, encouraging 
‘political, cultural and social open-mindedness’. 33  Although Kim 
achieved some partial successes, the complexities of this process 
were to be exposed as the economy moved towards collapse in 1997 
and the term segyehwa slowly dropped out of official usage. 
Anyway, whether APEC-inspired or not, under Kim Young-sam it 
did not imply any special priority being given to the Asian Pacific 
region, but rather a more general openness to the world. 
 
Faced with the priority of restoring confidence after the financial 
crisis, Kim Dae-jung launched an ambitious ‘second nation-
building’ campaign in August 1998, which did include as one of its 
themes ‘open globalism’, later redefined in external economic policy 
terms into making South Korea an ‘open trading nation’. Although 
Kim was willing to pursue liberalization and openness as a means to 
restore economic health, he did not set out improving links with the 
Asian neighbours as a special focus. Nevertheless, it was during Kim 
Dae-jung’s period in office that the ASEAN+3 process began to take 
off and also that South Korea made its first tentative steps towards 
promoting free trade agreements (FTAs) with important regional 
trading partners by opening negotiations with Chile. The logic 
behind this venture into FTAs was that ‘an expansion of free trade 
                                                 
32Information from a member of Kim Young-sam’s staff, March 1995. 
33Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995. 
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within regional blocs would ultimately complement Korea’s trade 
interests’.34 
 
Bradley Babson has argued that President Roh’s administration ‘has 
embraced the idea of regionalism as a major policy direction’ for 
South Korea.35 However, this judgement has to be qualified, in that 
Roh seems to have been focusing very much on North-east Asia 
rather than the wider Asian Pacific region. Indeed, Joo has argued 
that Roh’s foreign policy initially had only one aim: ‘to realize [a] 
peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asian age’ through South Korea 
acting as the ‘Northeast Asian Hub’, facilitated by ‘balanced 
pragmatic diplomacy’. 36  The prolonged second North Korean 
nuclear crisis, however, has proved a distraction for Roh’s policy-
making and it seems that not only has the ‘hub’ concept lost some 
momentum but also, as Joo argues, ‘the government has yet to come 
up with an innovative idea to link itself further and deeper with the 
development of East Asian regionalism’.37 
 
Nevertheless, while maybe not an innovative leader, South Korea 
has continued to be actively involved in regional meetings. Indeed, 
in December 2005 Roh spent nearly one week in Malaysia, probably 
his longest stay in any foreign country during his tenure in office, as 
he attended three regional multilateral meetings: ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN+1 (Korea) and the inaugural East Asian Summit (EAS).  
South Korea had been lagging behind both China and Japan in 
approaching ASEAN for FTA-style arrangements (and undoubtedly 
feeling some pressure as a result),38 but formal negotiations began in 
early 2005 and a basic agreement was reached in Kuala Lumpur in 
December 2005 on an ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA), 
                                                 
34 Inkyo Cheong, ‘Korea’s Embrace of Regionalism and the Economic Effects of its 
Bilateral FTAs with Chile and Japan’, in Charles Harvie, Hyun-Hoon Lee and 
Junggun Oh (eds), The Korean Economy: Post-Crisis Policies, Issues and Prospects 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), p. 223. 
35 Babson, op.cit., p. 102. 
36 Joo, op.cit. p.5. For more detail on the hub concept see Young-Tae Chang, ‘Korea’s 
Strategic Plan to be Northeast Asia’s logistics Hub: Towards the Pentaport Approach’, 
Korea Observer, Autumn 2003, pp.437-60. 
37 Ibid,. p. 6. Roh’s January 2006 New Year address contained only one brief mention 
of the ‘hub’ concept.  
38 Korea Herald, 1 July 2005 [internet edition, acc. 5.7.2005]. 
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with plans to resolve remaining differences, especially over services 
and investments, during further negotiations during 2006. 39 
Important for the future direction of the region was the EAS, at 
which India, Australia and New Zealand joined the ASEAN+3 
countries. The diversity – and controversial nature - of the 
membership of this new grouping (which might better be expressed 
as 10+3+3) means that, although the participating leaders agreed on 
establishing the EAS as a ‘forum for dialogue on broad strategic, 
political and economic issues of common interest and concern’, 
there remains considerable ambiguity over its role and future 
direction.40 ASEAN clearly wishes to be the driver of this new forum 
and with China and Japan jostling to influence its membership, 
South Korea is unlikely to be presented with any opportunities to be 
a leader.  
 
Traditionally Korea had always been aware of its vulnerability to the 
two neighbouring giants of China and Japan, and it has both 
benefited from and suffered from its geographical location 
sandwiched between them. Modern Korean nationalism, initially 
developed as an ideology to fight against Western encroachments in 
the nineteenth century and Japanese colonialism in the twentieth 
century, became utilised by both North and South as a means to 
rationalise their respective desires for unification. Such nationalist 
feelings continued consistently in the postwar period to find 
expression in the South against Japan, even though at times there 
was both conscious and unconscious borrowing from Japan, and in a 
more fluctuating manner against the United States, as bouts of anti-
Americanism alternated with a desire to utilise US capitalist and 
military strength. This meant that South Korean concepts of 
‘international’ or ‘global’ or even, it has to be said, ‘Asia’ were 
conditioned heavily by the nature of the two relationships with the 
dominating forces of Japan and the United States. In the past decade 
or so, of course, China has very firmly come into the equation as far 
as South Korean perceptions of the region and the outside world are 
                                                 
39 Korea Policy Review, January 2006, pp. 28-29.  
40 Wall Street Journal Asia, 15 December 2005. One ‘outside’ observer described the 
EAS as ‘anti-climactic and lacking in substance’. IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 11, 
Issue 10, December 2005, http://www.iiss.org/stratcom.  
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concerned. But the rise of China has done little to alter either the 
South Korean preoccupation with North-east Asia, as opposed to the 
broader Asian Pacific region, or, as Chae-jin Lee has argued, the 
South Koreans’ instinctive fear of ‘foreign domination and big 
power diplomacy’.41 
 
Against this background, what kind of role can a so-called ‘middle 
power’ such as South Korea play in the region?  According to Joo’s 
analysis, South Korea has fulfilled sufficient criteria – such as 
economic power, democratic status, and membership of regional and 
international organisations – to qualify as a ‘middle power’. South 
Korea has become and, despite its hiccups over the financial crisis, 
has remained one of the world’s top ten trading nations, with a per 
capita national income higher than many European states. While 
observers may argue over the extent of democratic consolidation, 
South Korea is clearly a democracy, even though, as has been argued 
earlier, this is not a necessary condition for qualification as a middle 
power. As discussed in this paper, it is also a member of all the 
important international and regional organisations. To this can be 
added the significant level of modernised military power, with 
increasing projection capabilities, now available to Korean 
presidents. While South Korea may appear ‘small’ by comparison 
with its immediate neighbours, China, Japan and Russia, in the 
wider international context it does meet the broad criteria of being a 
middle power.  
 
Yet, South Korea seems to be held back from ‘fully practicing 
middle power diplomacy or displaying middle power leadership’.42 
Joo suggests four reasons for this failure to meet expectations. Three 
of them can perhaps be combined into one, namely, that the 
capabilities, power and rivalry between China and Japan are too 
overwhelming for South Korea. The other reason is the handicap 
derived from the priority given to national security (such as the two 
nuclear crises and the current missile crisis). 43  Clearly, these do 
                                                 
41 Chae-jin Lee, ‘South Korean Foreign Relations Face the Globalization Challenges’, 
in Kim, op.cit., p.193. 
42 Joo, op.cit., p.7.  
43 Ibid, p.8. 
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represent very real influences, but, at the same time, they may have 
helped to nurture mind-sets in Korean policy-makers that inhibit 
them from fully appreciating the utility of broader regionalism and 
the desirability of trying to set out their own vision of regional order.   
 
The end of the Cold War and the later Asian financial crisis brought 
intense debate about the nature of regional order, but without any 
definite conclusion: American hegemony, an Asian concert of 
power, multilateral security cooperation regimes, Chinese-style 
‘harmonious’ co-existence have all been advocated and discussed.44 
Yet, South Korean leaders and officials have not been in the 
forefront of the debate and it is still unclear what is their ideal 
conception of broader regional order. 
 
Globalization, for good or ill, is a process which countries and 
peoples find difficult to resist. In relation to globalization, some 
countries have seen regionalism as a counter (even a ‘stumbling 
bloc’), while others have seen regionalism as a ‘building bloc’. 
While the jury is still out on such questions, there is little doubt that 
the trends towards regionalism are only going to be reinforced. 
South Korea does need to cultivate a more cosmopolitan outlook that 
would enable it to be more proactive and engaged in the wider Asian 
Pacific region. A more active regional profile by South Korea would 
undoubtedly be welcomed by the countries of South-east Asia, 
which remain wary of becoming over-dependent on the major 
regional powers of China and Japan.45 If the ‘Korean wave’ has done 
much to change attitudes and perceptions of Korea amongst peoples, 
companies and even governments around the Asian Pacific region, 
then surely Korea too needs to reciprocate, by reaching out to and 
understanding better the wider region in which it is situated. 
                                                 
44 For an early discussion by Korean scholars, see Chung-in Moon and Jung-hoon Lee, 
‘Unravelling the Next Asian Regional System: Historical Memory, Finite Deterrence, 
and Regional Cooperation’, Pacific Focus, Fall 1995, pp. 125-151. I am indebted to 
Xu Xin of Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University for alerting me to Chinese thinking on 
regional order. 
45 Interviews with academics and officials in Singapore, mid-June 2006.  
